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Abstract 
Take pragmatic encroachment to be the view that whether one knows that p is determined at 
least in part by the practical consequences surrounding the truth of p. This view represents a 
significant departure from the purist orthodoxy, which holds that only truth-relevant factors 
determine whether one knows. In this chapter I consider some consequences of accepting 
pragmatic encroachment when applied to problems of political knowledge and political ignorance: 
first, that there will be cases in which it will not be practically rational to acquire political 
knowledge when the stakes surrounding one’s political actions are high; second, that political 
knowledge can be more easily acquired when one values the welfare of others less; and third, that 
pragmatic encroachment may fail to account for a form of epistemic injustice when it comes to 
evaluating the political knowledge of members of marginalized groups. I argue that while these 
consequences are undesirable, the extent to which the pragmatic encroacher is committed to 
them depends both on the details of the theory, as well as the extent to which one considers 
political knowledge to be important. 
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1. Pragmatic Encroachment 
Pragmatic encroachment is the view that whether one knows a proposition is, at least in part, a 
function of the practical factors that surround the truth or falsity of that proposition1. The kinds of 
practical factors that are discussed most often are the stakes in being right or wrong such that, 
paradigmatically, the higher the stakes surrounding the truth of p, the more difficult it is to know 
that p2. Three main types of support have been put forth for the view: appeals to intuitive cases, 
empirical studies, and an argument that relies on a principled connection between knowledge and 
action.  
The first kind of support involves appealing to cases in which it seems that one’s willingness 
to ascribe knowledge varies with the relevant stakes. For example, say that you want to get to 
Spadina Avenue in order to check out a new ramen restaurant. While you have been to Spadina 
Avenue several times before, you are not an infallible city navigator; regardless, with very little at 
stake we may be happy to say that you know where Spadina Avenue is on the basis of your 
experience and memory. Consider now instead that getting to Spadina Avenue is a matter of life 
or death: the only pharmacy that carries your life-saving medicine is on that street, and it is closing 
soon. We then might have the following intuition: while your memory and experience are good 
enough to allow you to know where Spadina Avenue is when you are looking for a restaurant, it is 
not good enough when you are trying to get to the pharmacy. Given that you have the same 
memories and experiences in both cases, the argument goes, what stands in the way of your 
knowing are the high stakes. This is not to say that you could not come to know where the 
pharmacy is; indeed, you could come to know this after asking your friend who has been there 
many times for directions, or by using an app on your phone to plan a route, etc. The point is not 
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that high stakes make knowledge impossible, but rather that when the stakes are high, the 
standards for acquiring knowledge can become more demanding. 
While cases like these are ubiquitous in the pragmatic encroachment literature, they will do 
little to convince those who do not share the relevant intuitions. Some have thus appealed to 
empirical studies that investigate whether non-philosophers evaluate cases like the above in the 
same way as the pragmatic encroacher, or whether pragmatic encroachment can best explain 
certain patterns of knowledge ascriptions. Thus far, however, the results are inconclusive. While 
some studies have reported that the intuitions elicited by pragmatic encroachers are shared by 
non-philosophers (Sripada and Stanley 2012), others have failed to corroborate these results (Feltz 
and Zarpentine 2010; May et al. 2010; Schaffer and Knobe 2012; Buckwalter and Schaffer 2015; 
Rose et al. 2019). Other types of experiments are perhaps more promising. For instance, Pinillos 
(2012) conducted “evidence-seeking experiments” in which subjects were asked how much 
evidence one thought someone would need in order to count as knowing when the stakes varied 
(see also Francis et al. 2019), and Dinges and Zakkou’s (2020) study looked at patterns of 
retractions of knowledge attributions, providing results that support the view that such patterns 
shift when certain practical factors shift. While these new approaches provide support for 
pragmatic encroachment, it is still up for debate how best to interpret the various kinds of 
empirical results (see for discussion Buckwalter and Schaffer 2015; Boyd 2016; Weatherson 2017). 
The third and perhaps strongest form of support for pragmatic encroachment is a 
conceptual argument that relies on a principled relationship between knowledge and action. Say 
that knowledge is the norm of practical reason, such that if one knows that p then it is rational to 
act as if p. It then follows that since practical factors determine whether it is rational to act, so too 
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can they determine whether one knows. Again, consider the case of needing to get to Spadina 
Avenue when the stakes are high: since in this case it is not rational to act solely on the basis of 
what one remembers, then given the relationship between knowledge and action, neither will it 
be the case that one knows on that basis3. 
Pragmatic encroachment is thus appealing in that it can explain a range of intuitive cases, 
and is closely tied to what many see as a plausible relationship between knowledge and action. 
What has yet to be explored, however, are the consequences of applying the view to issues of 
political knowledge and ignorance. Before doing this, however, we need to get a sense of what 
some of these issues are. 
 
2. Political Knowledge and Political Ignorance 
What constitutes political knowledge? Boudreau and Lupia (2011) argue that, 
A common analytic definition of political knowledge is that it is a measure of a citizen’s 
ability to provide correct answers to a specific set of fact-based questions. Typical political 
knowledge questions include “What is the political office held by [name of current vice 
president, British prime minister, or chief justice of the United States]” and “Which party 
has the most seats in the U.S. House of Representatives?”  (p. 171) 
This definition is that which is often employed in empirical studies of the level of political 
ignorance of a populace (Barabas et al. 2014; Bischof and Senninger 2017). More broadly, though, 
we can define political knowledge not in terms of any specific content, but instead in terms of the 
role that knowledge plays in political actions. For instance, Cameron Boult (forthcoming) 
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characterizes political knowledge as involving “any belief that is of direct relevance to decision 
making on political issues” including issues like “whether to increase the national deficit, foreign 
aid, or to have public heath care” (p. 5). On this broader definition, while any proposition may be 
the object of political knowledge, whether it constitutes such knowledge will depend on the 
relevant context in which that knowledge is employed. While more can be said to make this notion 
more precise, I will here accept this broader conception. 
Many have argued that political knowledge is important for a well-functioning democracy. 
For instance, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) argue that, 
Public knowledge of and participation in politics are at the core of democratic processes. 
The quality of citizenship and the health of the collective are preconditioned by political 
knowledge and there is a positive relationship between knowledge and the act of voting. 
(p. 317) 
At the same time, it has been widely recognized that people are, by and large, politically ignorant 
(see Brennan (2016) and Somin (2016) for summaries of recent data). Given that an individual is 
likely to be politically ignorant, a question then becomes under what conditions it is practically 
rational4 for them to make the effort to acquire the political knowledge they lack, given that doing 
so comes at a practical cost. One argument for rational political ignorance concludes that it will 
often not, in fact, be worth it. Consider the case of voting in a large democracy: given that an 
individual vote is very unlikely to make a difference to the outcome, then even if it is the case that 
political knowledge allows one to make better voting decisions, it may not be worthwhile for one 
to acquire it for the purposes of voting, as the costs outweigh the expected benefits. 
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There are, however, reasons to be worried about rationalizing political ignorance. As Ilya 
Somin (2006) argues, 
The theory of rational ignorance implies not only that voters will acquire little or no 
political knowledge, but also that they will make little effort to use the knowledge they do 
have in a consistent and effective manner. It is not just that they might be apathetic; far 
worse, they sometimes use their knowledge in a way that increases the danger of making 
serious errors. (p. 256) 
Somin argues that one problem surrounding political ignorance is that there will be a gap between 
the practical rationality of voting and that of reducing one’s political ignorance. To show this, 
Somin first appeals to Derek Parfit’s (1984) argument that it can be rational for one to vote in a 
large democratic system “so long as the voter perceives a significant difference between 
candidates and cares even slightly about the welfare of fellow citizens, as well as [their] own” 
(Somin 2010, p. 205) . Somin defends this view via an expected utility calculation:  
 D*(300 million/1000)/(100 million) – Cv = Uv 
Where Uv is the expected utility of voting, Cv the practical cost of voting, and D the expected 
difference in welfare per person if the voter’s preferred candidate defeats their opponent, along 
with the assumption that one is participating in a system with 300 million voters, that one’s ballot 
has a 1/100 million chance of being decisive, and that the voter values the welfare of their fellow 
citizens 1000 times less than their own. Somin argues that on plausible values of these variables 
(i.e. given that one does, in fact, value the welfare of one’s fellow citizens at least a bit, that the 
difference in welfare that would result from electing different candidates is non-trivial, and that 
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the practical cost of voting is not too high) it will, in fact, turn out to be rational for one to vote 
(i.e. it will be the case that Uv > 0).  
Somin’s concern, however, is that it is much less likely to be practically rational to acquire 
political knowledge. To see why, he presents a similar calculation: 
D*(300 million/1000)/(100 million) – Cpi = Upi 
Where Upi is the expected utility of acquiring enough information to make the “right” decision 
when voting, and Cpi is the practical cost of reducing one’s political ignorance. The problem, Somin 
argues, is that the practical costs of acquiring political knowledge can be higher than the costs of 
voting5. As such, on plausible values of the relevant variables, it will often turn out that it is not 
practically rational to reduce one’s political ignorance (i.e. it is likely that Upi < 0). Somin ultimately 
argues that given that widespread political ignorance is a problem, we then need to better 
incentivize individuals to take measures to reduce said ignorance. How we might do this is a 
matter of ongoing debate6. 
We now have a general overview of pragmatic encroachment, as well as some problems 
surrounding political knowledge and ignorance. Next, I consider some consequences of accepting 
pragmatic encroachment when thinking about these problems. 
 
3. Three Consequences of Pragmatic Encroachment 
In this section I consider three consequences of pragmatic encroachment when it comes to issues 
of political knowledge and ignorance. These consequences centre on a general consequence of 
pragmatic encroachment, namely that as the standards for knowledge become more demanding, 
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so too do the practical costs of acquiring it. Thus, given that the paradigmatic case of pragmatic 
encroachment is one in which high stakes increases the demands on knowledge, so too will they 
increase the cost of acquiring political knowledge7. 
Consider an example. Say that I am trying to decide what to order at a restaurant, and that I 
have a terrible peanut allergy8. Despite the menu stating that a dish does not contain peanuts, if 
we accept pragmatic encroachment then I may not know that the dish does not contain peanuts 
on the basis of the available evidence, given that the stakes are high. In order to acquire this 
knowledge, then, I need to do some extra work, perhaps by acquiring additional evidence: I could, 
for example, ask a waiter to verify, or check with the chef, or run a detailed chemical analysis of 
the dish, etc. While acquiring this additional evidence may then put me in a position to know, it 
also comes at a practical cost. A consequence of accepting pragmatic encroachment, then, is that 
an increase in stakes leads not only to increased epistemic demands on acquiring knowledge, but 
also increased practical costs in acquiring that knowledge.  
Of course, how significant these costs are will vary depending on how much work one needs 
to do in order to meet the standards required for good decision-making (e.g. checking with the 
chef is a small cost, running a scientific analysis looking for peanut traces is a large one). 
Regardless, given that increased standards for knowledge bring along increased costs in acquiring 
it, pragmatic encroachment has three consequences for thinking about political knowledge and 
ignorance: first, that political ignorance can become more practically rational as the stakes 
surrounding one’s political actions go up; second, that one can acquire political knowledge by 
valuing the welfare of others less; and third, that pragmatic encroachment may warrant the 
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epistemically unjust treatment of members of marginalized groups. I address these consequences 
in turn. 
3.1 Rationalizing (Even More) Political Ignorance 
The first consequence of accepting pragmatic encroachment is that doing so can widen the gap 
between the practical rationality of political action and that of acquiring political knowledge. To 
see why, we need to get a sense of which factors determine the stakes when it comes to political 
actions. Consider again the above calculation of the expected utility of voting: here we see that 
the greater the expected difference in welfare and the higher the chances of one’s vote being 
impactful, the more rational it will be to vote, given that the cost of voting remains constant (e.g. 
it will take just as long to wait in line and cast a vote regardless of any other factors). However, 
these factors also determine, at least in part, the stakes involved in voting. For example, an 
election will be higher stakes if candidates have radically different policies with very different 
expected outcomes in terms of welfare for oneself and those one cares about, and lower stakes if 
the candidates have very similar policies, or have policies that have little impact on oneself and 
those one cares about. Thus, as the values of expected difference in welfare, concern for the 
welfare of others, and chance of one’s actions making a significant impact go up, so too (ceteris 
paribus) do the stakes9. 
The result is that accepting pragmatic encroachment also means accepting that there can be 
a larger gap between the practical utility of participating in a political process and that of acquiring 
political knowledge. For instance, say that you are going to vote in an election, the results of which 
will have significant practical importance to you. As the cost of voting is the same regardless of the 
stakes, it will become more rational to vote the more significant the practical consequences of 
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that vote. However, on a pragmatic encroachment view, more significant political actions can 
present more significant obstacles to acquiring political knowledge: as it will be more difficult to 
know when the stakes are higher, one will be required to acquire more evidence in order to 
possess that knowledge, which brings along a higher practical cost. The consequence is that it may 
be more practically rational for one to refrain from acquiring political knowledge when it comes to 
voting in high-stakes elections10. 
To illustrate this consequence a different way, consider an extension of the above restaurant 
case. Say that one has a peanut allergy, but is also extremely hungry; furthermore, given the high 
stakes, one is not in a position to know that one’s dish does not contain peanuts solely on the 
basis of the menu description. If the demands for knowledge are high enough, it can be practically 
rational for one to order the dish – given that one needs to satiate one’s hunger – despite it not 
being practically rational for one to do the work to acquire the relevant knowledge. The same, I 
argue, can be the case when it comes to voting in high-stakes elections: if the demands for 
knowledge are too high, it can remain practically rational for one to vote, despite it not being 
practically rational for one to acquire the relevant political knowledge. 
Of course, this will not always be the case: if the expected difference in welfare is very high, 
then the increased expected benefits of acquiring political knowledge may swamp the associated 
costs. Nevertheless, there will still be cases in which the stakes surrounding one’s political actions 
will be high, but in which it would be less practically rational to acquire political knowledge than if 
the stakes were lower. This consequence is undesirable insofar as it seems that possessing political 
knowledge is most important in high-stakes voting situations (although I consider a response to 
this in section 4). For example, while it may not be terribly important for one to possess political 
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knowledge when it comes to an election in which there is only a marginal difference between the 
candidates, when these differences are significant it seems that it is much more important that 
voters possess political knowledge in order to make the best decisions. We thus get the conclusion 
that a pragmatic encroachment view of political knowledge may rationalize political ignorance 
when it comes to decisions regarding participation in important political processes. 
3.2 Selfishness as a Means to Acquiring Political Knowledge 
A consequence of pragmatic encroachment generally is that when practical factors stand in the 
way of knowing, one can acquire knowledge if those factors become less significant. For example, 
if the stakes surrounding the presence of peanuts in my dish prevent me from knowing whether 
there are peanuts in my dish, then one way I could acquire this knowledge would be if the stakes 
were lowered, e.g. if someone gave me an epi-pen. Critics of pragmatic encroachment have 
argued that the view thus warrants odd ways of acquiring knowledge, as well as a concept of 
knowledge that is unstable, given that practical factors can change in unexpected ways (see 
Russell and Doris 2008; Kim 2017).  
Similar worries arise when considering political knowledge. For example, say that there are 
large potential differences in welfare for me given the results of an upcoming election, as one of 
the key issues pertains to increasing minimum wage, and I have very little money. Say also that I 
have collected some evidence with regards to the policies of the respective candidates, but, given 
that the stakes are high, I do not qualify as knowing which candidate is the right choice. One way 
that I could acquire political knowledge, then, would be if the stakes were to become lower as a 
result of my financial situation improving, e.g. if I get a new, well-paying job. It is prima facie odd, 
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however, that my employment status can have a direct impact on how much political knowledge I 
possess. 
There are additional ways that one can lower the stakes when it comes to one’s political 
knowledge; specifically, by valuing the welfare of others less. For instance, Edlin et al. (2007) argue 
that voting is likely not practically rational for someone who has purely selfish motives, given that 
a reduction in the concern for the welfare of others will result in a reduction in the overall 
expected utility. In general, then, the more one values the welfare of others, the more rational it 
will be to vote; at the same time, an increased concern for others will also raise the stakes 
surrounding one’s actions, thus making it more difficult and practically costly to acquire relevant 
political knowledge. Accepting pragmatic encroachment thus has the additional consequence that 
there is a seemingly implausible relationship between one’s concern for the welfare of others and 
the rationality of acquiring political knowledge, such that if one values the welfare of others too 
much then it may no longer be practically rational for one to acquire that knowledge. 
3.3 Political Ignorance and Epistemic Injustice 
A final consequence of pragmatic encroachment is that it may warrant the epistemically unjust 
treatment of members of marginalized groups when it comes to ascriptions of political knowledge. 
For example, consider a member of a minority group who has to choose between two white men 
in an election: both have histories of policy decisions that tend not to be favorable towards 
minorities, although one may end up making slightly more favorable policy decisions than the 
other. In this case the stakes for the minority voter may be much higher than a white male voter. 
As we have seen, a consequence of pragmatic encroachment is that as a result of these higher 
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stakes, the standards for knowing, and hence the practical costs of acquiring knowledge, will be 
higher for the minority voter. 
While the pragmatic encroacher will not take issue with any of this, a concern with this 
consequence is that it may run afoul of what seem to be instances of epistemic injustice. For 
instance, Mikkel Gerken (2019) argues that a consequence of pragmatic encroachment in general 
is that it can warrant a form of discriminatory epistemic injustice, i.e. discrimination against others 
as knowers in virtue of paradigmatically unjust features11. Gerken provides an example in which 
one’s financially dire circumstances can make the practical consequences surrounding the truth of 
some proposition more significant, which, according to the pragmatic encroacher, can prevent one 
from knowing it: pragmatic encroachment would thus warrant treating individuals in such 
circumstances as knowing less, given that they in fact do know less according to the theory. The 
worry, however, is that such treatment is not, in fact, warranted: if it is an injustice to treat such 
individuals as knowing less, then this is because they do, in fact, possess knowledge, but are being 
treated as if they do not.  
When applied to the domain of political knowledge, then, pragmatic encroachment has the 
consequence not only of potentially failing to account for the epistemically unjust treatment of 
marginalized groups, but also of deeming it less practically rational for members of marginalized 
groups to acquire said knowledge, given that doing so will be costlier. Again, consider the above 
case where a member of a minority group needs to decide between which of two white male 
candidates she will vote for. Given that the stakes are higher for her than for someone who will 
not be affected nearly as much by the outcome, the demands of knowing which candidate is the 
better choice will be much higher, and hence it will also be much more practically costly for her to 
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acquire that knowledge. Given the increased practical costs, however, it may be less practically 
rational for her to acquire that political knowledge. Pragmatic encroachment may then warrant an 
additional kind of injustice, one that deems it practically irrational for a member of a minority to 
acquire political knowledge. 
In this section I have traced three consequences of applying pragmatic encroachment to 
problems of political knowledge and ignorance, all of which appear to run afoul of commitments 
one might have with regards to the value of political knowledge, appropriate means of acquiring 
political knowledge, and epistemic injustice. In the next and final section, I will consider a possible 
response on behalf of the pragmatic encroacher. 
 
4. Pragmatic Encroachment and the Value of Political Knowledge 
Does the pragmatic encroacher have any recourse for dealing with these worries? Possibly. 
Consider first that in discussing political knowledge and ignorance, I have assumed that there is an 
important connection between them, such that in reducing political ignorance one aims to acquire 
political knowledge. However, one might deny this, and thereby call into question whether there is 
any particular value in possessing political knowledge when it comes to making good political 
decisions. For instance, some have argued that individuals can make good political decisions solely 
on the basis of heuristics (such as party affiliation) and other kinds of information cues (i.e. “bits of 
information that enable people to make judgments and decisions about an attitude object without 
in-depth knowledge” (Bowler and Nicholson 2018, p. 382)), while others have argued that 
individual-level ignorance is not necessarily a barrier to good decision-making at the group level. 
For instance, Hélène Landemore (2013) argues for what she calls the “strong epistemic argument 
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for democracy”: despite there being widespread political ignorance at the level of individual 
members of a democratic society, decisions made in a democracy will typically be better than 
those made in other political systems, given the epistemic benefits of cognitive diversity (i.e. that 
in the right circumstances, due to differences in the ways that individuals interpret the world, 
mistakes in reasoning will systematically cancel each other out, resulting in overall better decision-
making in the aggregate (p. 160)). If the aim of reducing political ignorance is to attempt to make 
good political decisions, either at the individual or societal level, then it may be the case that 
political knowledge is, strictly speaking, not very important in achieving this goal. 
What the pragmatic encroacher might argue, then, is that even if political knowledge 
becomes more difficult to acquire as the stakes go up, the costs of reducing political ignorance 
may not, given that one does not need to meet the standards of political knowledge for one to 
contribute to a good decision-making at the societal level. This response may be available 
especially for a view of pragmatic encroachment in which it is only the standards for knowledge, 
but not one’s epistemic position otherwise, that is affected by political considerations (see Fantl 
and McGrath 2009). Whether this response is enough to immunize the pragmatic encroacher 
against the three consequences I have presented here will depend both on how one interprets the 
details of pragmatic encroachment, as well as what one takes the relationship between political 
ignorance and knowledge to be. 
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1 Here I will focus on the metaphysical thesis (i.e. one that pertains to the nature of knowledge), 
and will not have anything to say about a strictly semantic version of the view (i.e. one that 
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2 Other factors, such as time constraints with regards to forming a belief or acting, have also been 
proposed as a potentially relevant practical consideration (see Shin 2014). It is also up for debate 
as to whether practical factors affect knowledge directly, or only indirectly in virtue of affecting 
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belief. For example, one might argue that one is simply less likely to believe that p when the stakes 
surrounding p are high, and thus may fail to know only in virtue of failing to believe (see Ganson 
2008; Nagel 2010; Gerken 2017). Here I will take pragmatic encroachment to be the view that 
practical factors are relevant to knowledge regardless of their effects on belief. 
3 Versions of this argument can be found in Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), Fantl and McGrath 
(2009), and elsewhere. They have, as one might suspect, also received their share of objections 
(see e.g. Williamson 2005; Brown 2008; Gerken 2017). 
4 There are, of course, other kinds of value that one might consider when determining whether 
one should acquire political knowledge, especially epistemic or moral value. Here, however, I will 
only be concerned with practical value associated with decision-making. However, depending on 
what one takes the relationship between stakes and standards for epistemic rationality to be, 
discussions of others kinds of value may be relevant, as well. 
5 How costly it is to acquire political knowledge will of course not be uniform for everyone. Indeed, 
there will be cases in which acquiring such knowledge will be easy and low cost, e.g. cases in which 
one can acquire some relevant political knowledge just by Googling. That being said, what is 
important for Somin’s view is that there can be some political matters that require more effect to 
be known, say by requiring in-depth research, consulting experts, etc. 
6 Somin’s own solutions focus on measures meant to provide individuals with more effective ways 
of participating in a political system, and by significantly reducing the size of government (see 
Somin 2010; see Page 2015 for criticism). 
7 I say this is the paradigmatic case as I leave it open that it is not necessarily the case that for 
every proposition and every practical consequence, high stakes increases the demands on 
knowledge (for instance, Anderson and Hawthorne (2019) argue that there can be cases in which 
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higher stakes result in the standards for knowledge being less demanding). However, it is also the 
case that the pragmatic encroacher ought not be satisfied with a bare existential claim (i.e. merely 
that there is some proposition, in some possible circumstance, in which practical factors affect the 
demands of knowing it) lest they pull all the teeth from the theory. 
8 Cases like this are common throughout the literature; for an empirical study of similar cases, see 
Sripada and Stanley (2012). 
9 One might wonder whether in such a situation the stakes surrounding one’s vote should be 
considered “high”, given that one still has only a very small chance of making a difference in the 
outcome of the election. There are a few potential responses to this worry. First, given that the 
chance of making a difference is only one variable among many that determine what is at stake for 
someone, merely having a low chance of making a difference does not preclude a situation from 
being high stakes. Second, I am here making a comparative claim, i.e. that more significant 
differences in candidates make stakes higher, even though they may not be overall very high. 
Finally, there are additional consequences beyond the outcome of an election that can be taken 
into account when determining the stakes surrounding one’s voting, for instance those pertaining 
to one’s political interests. 
10 Again, consider the above equation for the utility of reducing political ignorance, i.e. Upi = 
D*(300 million/1000)/(100 million) – Cpi. There can then be cases which Upi is positive, given that 
D*(300 million/1000)/(100 million) > Cpi. A consequence of pragmatic encroachment is that as the 
left side increases, so too does the right side. However, there is no reason to think that the 
increases will be uniform. For instance, it can be the case that the costs of meeting the standards 
for knowledge according to pragmatic encroachment will swamp the expected difference in 
expected welfare, depending on how difficult it is to meet the increased epistemic standard. 
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11 These and related notions of epistemic injustice originate in Fricker (2007). 
